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MUNICIPAL CORPORA TIONS-MAsTER PLANs-PowER OF CmES To 
ZONE FOR FUTURE CONDITIONS-After purchasing land which was subject to a 
zoning ordinance requiring a minimum lot size of 21,780 square feet, 
plaintiffs, real estate developers, challenged the ordinance as unreasonable 
and confiscatory. Defendant city argued that the ordinance was based upon 
a comprehensive master plan and had the purpose of limiting future density 
of population in accordance with sewage capacity. On appeal from the 
circuit court order invalidating the zoning ordinance as applied to plain-
tiff's property, held, judgment affirmed, three judges dissenting. A city 
zoning ordinance requiring a minimum lot size for the purpose of limiting 
future density of population in proportion to sewage capacity is arbitrary, 
unreasonable, unrelated to the present needs of the community and, 
therefore, invalid. Christine Bldg. Co. v. City of Troy, 367 Mich. 508, ll6 
N.W.2d 816 (1962). 
Since the historic case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,1 local 
units of government have devised manifold zoning ordinances2 attempting 
to promote or secure the "health, safety, morals and general welfare of 
the community." The prevalent statutory requirement that zoning ordi-
nances be passed in accordance with a "general plan"3 has produced 
a concurrent growth in the concept of planning. Municipal planning, in 
its incipient stage, legally meant little more than the papers or maps on 
which the regulatory ordinances were based.4 Under many of the earfy 
enabling acts, the planning requirement could be met through an a 
posteriori method of drawing zoning maps reflecting the existing com-
munity conditions.5 But the pains of urban growth demanded a guiding 
and predictive force,6 which gave birth to a more sophisticated form of 
planning-the "master plan," a professionally drawn, long-term advisory 
plan for the physical development of the community. 7 The master plan 
differs from the general plan required by the zoning enabling acts in at 
least three aspects. First, it derives its existence from separate state enabling 
acts which authorize municipal planning.8 Second, the purpose of the 
1 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (held, due process does not prohibit reasonable restrictions upon 
use of land imposed under state's police power). 
2 For a general discussion of the types of zoning ordinances now in use, see CluBBET, 
THE LAW OF PROPERTY 323-26 (1962). 
8 The terminology varies. State statutes refer to "comprehensive plans," "city plans," 
"development plans," and "plans." For purposes of this discussion, "general plan" will 
be used to denote the minimum planning requirements of a typical zoning enabling 
act. See generally Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARv. L. REv. 
1154 n.3 (1955). 
4 See POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1961). 
Ii See, e.g., Kozesnik v. Montgomery Twp., 24 N.J. 154, 165-66, 131 A.2d 1, 7-8 (1957); 
Haar, supra note 3, at 1157. 
6 See Mansfield &: Swett, Inc, v. Town of West Orange, 120 N.J.L. 145, 150-51, 198 
Atl. 225, 229 (Sup. Ct. 1938). 
7 See Haar, supra note 3, at 1155. For purposes of this discussion, "master plan" 
refers to a professionally drawn plan authorized by state planning legislation. See gener-
ally BASSETT, THE MASTER PLAN 82-90 (1938). 
s See POOLEY, op, cit. supra note 4, at 13-14. 
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master plan is to provide recommendations for the development, location, 
and character of streets, bridges, parks, waterways, public buildings, and 
public utilities, as well as for a zoning plan.9 Third, the master plan is 
the product of professional planners and is based on comprehensive, 
analytical surveys of the social, economic, and physical conditions of the 
community. While the objectives of the master plan would appear to be 
both momentous and salutary, the plan must at least in part depend for 
its efficacy upon a valid zoning ordinance to implement its recommenda-
tions.10 
The decision in the principal case both illustrates the dependence of 
master planning upon the establishment of valid zoning ordinances and 
serves as a warning that the courts may use essentially the same criteria 
in reviewing all zoning ordinances, regardless of whether based on master 
plans or general plans. The traditional test of the validity of a zoning 
measure is its "reasonableness," which generally requires that the ordi-
nance be within the scope and purpose of the power granted to the 
municipal unit.11 Judicial attitudes toward the valid exercise of the 
zoning power vary from a willingness to find zoning for merely aesthetic 
considerations reasonable to an insistence upon a literal interpretation of 
the requirements that zoning further the public health, safety, morals and 
general welfare.12 The Michigan courts have followed the latter approach 
and have restrictively construed the cities' police power in this area by 
requiring zoning ordinances to have a tangible relationship to the 
health, safety, or morals of the community.13 The language of the principal 
9 See Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw & CoNTE!ltP. 
PROB. 353, 361-66 (1955). See also MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.36 (1948): "It shall be the 
. • . duty of the [municipal planning] commission to make and adopt a master plan 
for the physical development of the municipality •... Such plan . . . shall show the 
commission's recommendations for the development of said territory, including • • • the 
general location, character, and extent of streets ... bridges, waterways ... playgrounds 
. • • the general location of public buildings . . • and the general location and extent of 
public utilities .•• as well as a zoning plan for the control of the height, area, bulk, loca-
tion, and use of buildings and premises .... " 
10 See PooLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 18-20. 
11 E.g., Pere Marquette Ry. v. Township Bd., 298 Mich. 31, 298 N.W. 393 (1941); 
City of North Muskegon v. Miller, 249 Mich. 52, 227 N.W. 743 (1929). The "reasonable-
ness" limitation on municipal legislative power has a twofold basis: the constitutional 
due process requirement that every act based on the state's police power have a 
reasonable relationship to a legitimate end of the state and, second, the judicially 
imposed restriction that municipal ordinances be consistent with the extent of power 
delegated to the municipality through state enabling acts, i.e., reasonableness in an 
ultra vires sense. See Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 205-08, 32 N.W.2d 
538, 548-50 (1948) (Loring, C.J., dissenting). 
12 Compare Senior v. Zoning Comm'n, 146 Conn. 531, 153 A.2d 415 (1959), and 
Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942), and Fischer v. Township of Bed-
minster, 11 N.J. 194, 93 A.2d 378 (1952), with Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, 329 
Mich. 331, 338, 45 N.W.2d 306, 310 (1951), and Frischkorn Constr. Co. v. Building In-
spector, 315 Mich. 556, 563, 24 N.W.2d 209, 212 (1946). 
13 The Michigan court has indicated that an ordinance based solely on considera-
tions such as aesthetic purposes, civic pride, and community contentment is not suf-
ficiently related to the state's police power. At best, such considerations give secondary 
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case seems to indicate that the ordinance in question was invalidated 
because it was based on merely expectant conditions and that, as a result, 
it failed to establish the necessary relationship to a legitimate use of the 
state's police powers.14 To interpret the case as unequivocally standing 
for the proposition that regulations based on expectant conditions are 
unreasonable, however, would be to emasculate master planning. If such 
a narrow view of permissible prediction prevails, municipalities that 
attempt to prevent future difficulties, such as inadequate water and sewage 
capacity, will be faced with "a cancerous situation . . . which will permit 
almost any city plan to be destroyed piecemeal without any examination 
or consideration of the overall city plan [i.e., master plan] .... "15 The 
court could have precluded this possible result and still have reached the 
same decision by a more thorough analysis of the particular factual cir-
cumstances underlying the case. For instance, since the defendant City of 
Troy had contracted with the City of Detroit for the former's sewage 
disposal, the City of Troy attempted to justify its minimum lot size 
requirements on the basis of the limited sewage capacity, imposed by 
that contract.16 Though it is highly doubtful that ordinances which are 
founded upon self-imposed limitations would be invalidated for that 
reason, such limitations do detract from the equities in favor of the 
ordinance.17 Plaintiffs argued that the city could easily provide by contract 
for enlarged capacity when the need arose, and the court observed that,. 
prior to the time when the existing sewage disposal capacity would be 
reached, technological advances might have obviated the problem of further 
increases.18 Plaintiffs also demonstrated that the economic probability-
of demand for lots of the size contemplated by the city's plan appeared 
questionable. The ordinance required nearly fifty percent of the munici-
pality's residential area to consist of lots of an area of 15,000 or more 
square feet.19 This not only cast a shadow over the probability of a market 
demand for the multitude of large-size lots so created,20 but also raised 
questions concerning discrimination against prospective residents of moder-
support to the validity of the ordinance. See Hitchman v. Township of Oakland, supra 
note 12, at 338. But see City of Miami Beach v. Ocean 8c Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 
So. 2d 364 (1941). 
14 For instance, the court stated that it has "consistently held that the reasonable-
ness of a zoning restriction must be tested according to existing facts and conditions 
and not some condition which might exist in the future." Principal case at 516. See 
Roll v. City of Troy, 370 Mich. 94, 120 N.W.2d 804 (1963). 
15 Principal case at 524 (Adams, J., dissenting). 
16 Id. at 518. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Id. at 517. 
10 Joint Appendix, pp. 17la-172a. 
20 Sec Comer v. City of Dearborn, 342 Mich. 471, 476, 70 N.W.2d 813, 815-16 (1955); 
Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 439, 70 N.W.2d 772, 773 (1955). See also 
Corthouts v. Town of Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 99 A.2d 112 (1953). 
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ate financial means.21 This argument was strengthened by the absence of 
market studies in the master plan indicating a ready market for such 
houses as would have to be built on the lot sizes in question.22 Finally, 
the possibility for the plaintiffs to realize a fair return on their investment 
within a reasonable amount of time was doubtful.23 The property in ques-
tion was located close to an elite residential district which offered more 
desirable lots with less onerous lot size requirements,24 thereby impairing 
the ready marketability of plaintiffs' property. 
The presence of these circumstances relieved the court from having 
to face the question of whether ordinances based upon a master plan must 
be tested for reasonableness solely in the light of existing conditions and 
circumstances, as the rule has been with regard to zoning ordinances based 
upon general pfans.25 When this question is presented the court will have 
to take account of the impact of the planning enabling act,26 which 
indicates a legislative intent that such plans, and necessarily ordinances 
based thereon, should be prognostic in nature. The problems of rapid 
urban growth, increasingly the topic of both sociological and political 
attention, should move the court to relax its insistence upon existing 
conditions as the standard of reasonableness in matters of municipal 
restrictions upon land use. The principal case should be read, therefore, 
not as a condemnation of ordinances based upon anticipated conditions 
and problems, but merely as an indication to municipal planners of the 
factors and considerations which should be included in their plans in 
order to harmonize the master plan with the existing legal framework 
into which the implementing ordinances must fit. Such an approach 
would enhance the master plan as an effective, guiding instrument for 
community growth. 
Walter A. Urick 
21 Brief for Appellee, pp. 35-36. See Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). 
22 Joint Appendix, p. 172a. 
23 Although the Michigan Supreme Court has often stated that a zone is not 
invalidated because it decreases a landowner's profit, the court, in determining the 
reasonableness of a condemnation or zoning measure, has examined the e.xtent of 
diminution in the value of the zoned property, Janesick v. City of Detroit, 337 Mich. 
549, 554-55, 60 N.W.2d 452, 455 (1953), the proximity of the property in question to 
non-regulated or dissimilarly zoned areas, McGiverin v. City of Huntington Woods, 
343 Mich. 413, 418-19, 72 N.W.2d 105, 107-08 (1955), and the impairment of the 
alienability of the property in question, Board of Educ. v. Baczewski, 340 Mich. 265, 65 
N .W .2d 810 (1954). See Cram, Master Planning Creates Clouds on Titles, 35 Mich. 
S.B.J., April 1956, p. 9. 
24 Joint Appendix, p. 113a. 
25 See, e.g., Township of West Bloomfield v. Chapman, 351 Mich. 606, 88 N.W.2d 
377 (1958); Gust v. Township of Canton, 342 Mich. 436, 70 N.W.2d 772 (1955). But see 
Zahn v. Board of Pub. Works, 195 Cal. 497, 513, 234 Pac. 388, 395 (1925), afj'd, 274 
U.S. 325 (1927). 
26 MICH. COMP. LAws § 125.31 (Supp. 1961); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 125.32-.45 (1948). 
